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LET'S TALK ABOUT SEX DISCRIMINATION: THE TENTH
CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN DICK V. PHONE DIRECTORIES Co.
INTRODUCTION
The term "sexual harassment" popularly conjures an image of a
dedicated but vulnerable young woman who is working in a male-
dominated field. Under the threat of firing, she is forced to endure late-
night sexual rendezvous in a dimly lit high-rise office with her predatory
male boss. While striking, this image represents only one facet of what
Congress and the Supreme Court considers sexual harassment.
Today, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),'
the broad federal statutory scheme that addresses discriminatory em-
ployment practices, sexual harassment encompasses claims with no tan-
gible economic loss to the victim and is no longer limited to traditional
man-woman relationships. Since the Supreme Court decided the seminal
case Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services2 in 1998, same-sex hostile
work environment harassment claims are actionable under Title VII.3 A
sexual hostile work environment claim alleges that the conditions of the
plaintiff's work environment are altered due to severe and pervasive sex-
ual harassment by co-workers.4 Under Oncale, a plaintiff bringing a
sexual hostile environment claim must meet two requirements. First, the
harassment must be severe enough to discriminate.5 Second and most
importantly, the discrimination must be "because of... sex."6 The "be-
cause of sex" language demands that the discrimination against an em-
ployee must be motivated by her sex. If this element is not met the plain-
tiff has not been the victim of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII,
regardless of how unpleasant her work environment is.7 Oncale's em-
phasis on this causation element in sexual harassment cases has resulted
in a very limited scope of interpretation for same-sex harassment issues.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently
addressed same-sex harassment for the first time in Dick v. Phone Direc-
tories Co. 8 In Dick, the Tenth Circuit held that a same-sex sexual har-
assment hostile work environment claim satisfies the "because of sex"
requirement if the plaintiff proves that her harasser's actions were moti-
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 2005).
2. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
3. Oncale, 523 U.S.at 78.
4. See Meritor Sav. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
5. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
6. Id. at 78.
7. See Taken v. Okla. Corp. Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1369 (10th Cir. 1997).
8. 397 F.3d 1256 (2005).
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vated by sexual desire.9 This contrasts with other circuits, which have
alternatively required a showing that the same-sex harasser is a homo-
sexual in order to satisfy the "because of sex" requirement. 10 This article
will analyze the Tenth Circuit's holding in light of other Circuits' ap-
proaches, and will demonstrate why, within the restrictive confines of
Oncale, the Tenth Circuit's approach best articulates the goals of Title
VII: prevention and deterrence of harassment in the workplace.11 The
article will further argue that the Supreme Court's narrow definition of
the term "because of sex" in Its Oncale decision fails to adequately pre-
vent all types of sex discrimination.
Part I of this article will examine the unusual roots of the sexual
harassment doctrine, focusing on the development of the hostile work
environment claim. Part II will explore Oncale and its progeny. Part III
will summarize the facts and the holding of Dick. Part IV will first ar-
gue that although superficially, Oncale expanded the scope of Title VII
by expressly recognizing same-sex harassment claims, its emphasis on
causation actually limits the scope of sexual harassment claims. Despite
this restriction, the Tenth Circuit found the broadest possible interpreta-
tion of Oncale in Dick. Finally, Part IV will conclude with the argument
that a broader interpretation of "sex" under Title VII is needed to address
work-place harassments that remain unpunishable under Oncale's cur-
rent guidelines.
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT DEFINED
Title VII states that it is "an unlawful employment practice for an
employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 12 The
House of Representatives added the term "sex" to the enumerated list of
prohibited discriminatory motives in the eleventh hour of debate on the
bill, in an attempt to defeat the entire amendment the day before it
passed. 13 Because of the last-minute nature of the amendment, there was
very little legislative history to aid the courts in interpreting what consti-
tutes discrimination based on sex.' 4 In addition, there was no clear legis-
lative intent to prohibit any kind of sex discrimination in the workplace,
9. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1264. The Tenth Circuit also noted that Oncale provides that the infer-
ence of sexual harassment can be drawn without showing the harasser was motivated by sexual
desire when the issue does not involve "explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity." Id. at 1263.
10. Id. at 1264.
11. Julie A. Seaman, Form and (Dys)function in Sexual Harassment Law: Biology, Culture,
and the Spandrels of Title VII, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 321,432 (2005).
12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (West 2005).
13. See Linda Kelly Hill, The Feminist Misspeak of Sexual Harassment, 57 FLA. L. REv. 133,
144-45 (2005).
14. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
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and the term was virtually meaningless in the early years after Title VII
was passed. 15
Initially, "sexual harassment" had no relationship with the vague
idea of "sexual discrimination" that was theoretically prohibited by Title
VII. 16 In fact, the term "sexual harassment" was coined outside the legal
spectrum by the feminist group Working Women United, who defined
sexual harassment as "the treatment of women workers as sexual ob-
jects."'17 While accurate, this definition failed to define any disparate
treatment of women and therefore, remained outside the aegis of Title
VII.'
8
A. Feminism and the Importance of Gender
Feminists have long controlled the theory of sexual harassment.' 9
In the simplest terms, feminists initially argued (and continue to do so
today) that there is a disparate level of male power in society because
males control gender roles. 20  Today, conventional sexual harassment
wisdom accepts as true that sex and gender are two separate ideas.2, Sex
is considered a product of nature, while gender is a function of culture.22
Sex refers to the biological nature of men and women, while gender is a
fabricated social construct that suggests the biological differences be-
tween men and women dictate the societal role each must play.23 Femi-
nists focus on this notion of gender as a fictional construction and assert
that gender and gender roles have been created by men for the purpose of
subordinating women.24 This male control over gender has resulted in a
pervasive patriarchal "gender hierarchy" in the workplace.25 Within this
framework of unequal power, feminists view sexually harassing practices
as a means to subordinate women, and therefore, discriminate against
them.26 Feminists, in their definition of sexual harassment, focus on har-
assment based on one's gender.
1. Catharine MacKinnon
Professor Catharine MacKinnon, described as one of the foremost
architects of the sexual harassment doctrine,27 is credited for bringing
15. See Hill, supra note 13, at 144-45.




20. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 358.
21. See Katherine Franke, The Central Mistake in Sexual Discrimination Law: The Disaggre-
gation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995).
22. See id.
23. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 356, 358.
24. See id at 358.
25. See Hill, supra note 13, at 140.
26. See id, at 155.
27. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 421.
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sexual harassment under the auspices of Title VII by expressly highlight-
ing the discriminatory consequences of sexual harassment.28 She defined
sexual harassment as, "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements
in the context of a relationship of unequal power., 29 By naming women
as subordinates in the gender-based disparate power structure of the
American workplace, Professor MacKinnon was able to cast the neces-
sary discriminatory hue over sexual harassment.3 °
Armed with this definition, Professor MacKinnon defined two types
of sexual discrimination. The first she called quid pro quo: where an
employer conditions employment benefits on sexual favors. 31 Here, Pro-
fessor MacKinnon was able to identify the sex discrimination easily:
only women are being forced to provide sexual favors in return for what
should be a natural employment right.32 Second, she found sexual dis-
crimination existed in a "hostile work environment., 33 She viewed this
as a counterpart to a quid pro quo claim because working in an environ-
ment filled with "pervasive intimidation, ridicule, and insult" served to
subordinate women at the hands of their male counterparts. 34 Professor
MacKinnon found sexual discrimination in quid pro quo cases through
men expressly using their superior gender role to exert power over
women, while she found sexual discrimination in a hostile environment
because she saw in such instances men implicitly wielding sex "differ-
ences" as a subordinating power over their female co-workers.35
B. The Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claim
While a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim is unique to sex-
specific offenses and fairly straightforward in its requirements, the sexual
hostile work environment claim is more ambiguous. The formal legal
recognition that a hostile environment could be a type of sexual harass-
ment was a later development that arose from two distinct logical argu-
ments. First, the doctrine grew from Professor MacKinnon's feminist
argument that a hostile work environment had the same discriminatory
effect as the "classic" quid pro quo sexual harassment case.37 Second,
previous to the express judicial recognition of the sexual hostile envi-
ronment claim, it was widely recognized that a racial discrimination
claim based on hostile work environment was actionable.38 The sexual
28. See Hill, supra note 13, at 145.
29. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979).
30. See Hill, supra note 13, at 146.
31. MAcKINNON, supra note 29, at 32.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2.
34. Id.
35. See Hill, supra note 13, at 146.
36. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 417.
37. See id.
38. See id.
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hostile environment claim developed in part as a logical analogy to this
accepted standard.39
1. The Gender Subordination Argument
A Quidpro quo sexual discrimination case casts the injury in terms
of concrete choices a woman must make: comply with her supervisor's
demands for sexual favors, or suffer an adverse employment action.40 A
hostile work environment claim, on the other hand, presents a more sub-
tle type of injury--one that affects an employee's performance, the like-
lihood of her advancing, or even the chances of her choosing to remain at
her position.41 Professor MacKinnon and other feminists argued that
despite the ambiguity, a hostile environment created from an "an aggre-
gation of words and conduct ... [had the effect of] exclud[ing] or con-
trol[ing] the victim or victims, often through humiliation or fear. 'A2 In
addition, because men remain in the dominate position in the gender hi-
erarchy of the workplace, it is women that suffer the harassment. 43 This
disparate treatment creates a discriminatory result from the harassment.
44
2. The Racial Harassment Analogy
The first hostile environment harassment claim was recognized by
federal courts in Rogers v. EEOC.45 In Rogers, the plaintiff claimed her
employer, an optometrist, treated patients preferentially according to
their race.46 In a now familiar holding, the Fifth Circuit held that the
phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" is necessarily an
expansive concept; one that should be interpreted broadly.47 Within such
a broad interpretation, the court went on to find that "[working in an at-
mosphere permeated with] extreme racial . . . bigotry or ridicule impli-
cated a 'term or condition' of employment sufficient to trigger Title VII
protection regardless of whether a tangible employment action was
taken."' 8
Soon after Rogers, various appellate courts extended this reasoning
to a sexual hostile work environment claim.49 However, while both ra-
cial and sexual hostile environment claims needed to demonstrate that
the harassment was severe enough to interfere with the terms or condi-
tions of employment, this threshold was much more ambivalent in the
39. See id.
40. See id at 422.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 424.
43. See Hill, supra note 13, at 145.
44. See id.
45. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
46. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 240.
47. Id. at 238.
48. Seaman, supra note 11, at 417.
49. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11 th Cir. 1982).
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sexual context.50 Some courts complained that the same sexual behavior
that may be unwelcome in one context could be perfectly appropriate in
another.5' Others expressed concern about the subjective nature of the
sexual claim, noting that it largely depended on the singular interpreta-
tion of "harassment" by the victim. 52 These concerns combined to make
the threshold for determining whether a claim for sexual hostile envi-
ronment existed higher than its racial harassment counterpart. 3
3. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
54
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court first en-
dorsed the viability of a hostile work environment sexual harassment
claim by enlisting both the feminist reasoning as well as the logical anal-
ogy of the racial hostile environment claim.5 The resulting broad read-
ing of Title VII was similar to the interpretation in Rogers,56 but also
focused exclusively on the paradigmatic dominant man versus victimized
woman sexual harassment case, therefore embracing the feminist frame-
work of a gender based hierarchy. 7
Meritor involved Plaintiff Mechelle Vinson, who worked as a teller
at the Defendant bank. During her four year employment, it was undis-
puted that Ms. Vinson was promoted from teller to head teller to assistant
branch manager based on merit alone. 8 However, after Ms. Vinson was
fired for taking an excessively long sick leave, she brought suit against
her former employer, claiming that during her four year employment, she
was subjected to more or less constant sexual harassment by her supervi-
sor, Mr. Taylor, and that this harassment created a hostile work environ-
ment.5 9 Her allegations included repeated touching and fondling, many
occasions of sexual intercourse (to which Ms. Vinson allegedly acqui-
esced for fear of losing her job), and episodes where Mr. Taylor followed
her into the women's restroom and exposed himself to her.60
During trial, Mr. Taylor denied all allegations, but the trial court
never endorsed either party's story.6' Instead, the court held that even if
Ms. Vinson's version of the facts were true, she did not experience sex-
ual discrimination under Title VII because she did not suffer a tangible
economic lOSS. 62 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
50. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 419.
51. See id. at 420.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
55. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67.
56. Id.
57. See Hill, supra note 13, at 148.
58. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 59-60.
59. See id at 60.
60. Id.
61. Id at 61.
62. See id.
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cuit reversed.63 Relying on a previous holding of a case6 it had recently
decided, the court found that it was possible to find sexual discrimination
based on sexual behavior that created a hostile work environment. 65 The
Supreme Court affirmed, using various justifications for locating a hos-
tile environment claim.66
The Court in Meritor pointed toward the language of Title VII it-
self.67 It held that "the phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment., 68 This is
similar to the language the Fifth Circuit used in Rogers.69 The broad
interpretation of the "terms and conditions" language in Title VII under-
lined the Court's acceptance of the racial harassment analogy. 70 How-
ever, the Court's presumption of a male harasser and a female victim
demonstrated that the Court was also embracing MacKinnon's male sub-
ordination framework.71
II. ONCALE V. SUNDOWNER OFFSHORE SERVICES 72 AND SAME-SEX
HARASSMENT
A. Brief Overview of Same-Sex Claims Between Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson73 and Oncale
Meritor left many questions unanswered, including whether hostile
environment same-sex harassment claims were actionable under Title
VII. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Oncale, Circuits ap-
proached the problem in various ways. In Doe v. City of Belleville,74 the
Seventh Circuit held that the presence of a hostile environment sufficed
to establish a valid claim under Title VII even if the harasser and the
harassed were of the same sex. 7 5 Doe involved sixteen-year-old twin
boys who were routinely harassed by their co-workers at a cemetery.76
H. Doe, one of the plaintiffs, was routinely called a "bitch" and asked
63. Id. at 62.
64. The Court of Appeals relied on Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(finding an actionable sexual harassment claim based on the finding of a hostile work environment).
65. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 62.
66. Id. at 63.
67. Id. at 64.
68. Id. (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978)
(citation omitted)).
69. See Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238 ("[T]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment' in Section 703 [of Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit
the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimina-
tion.").
70. See Hill, supra note 13, at 148.
71. Id.
72. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
73. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
74. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
75. Doe, 119 F.3d at 577-78.
76. Id. at 566.
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whether he was a boy or a girl.77 After enduring months of taunts such
as these and repeated threats of assault, both twins quit after a co-worker
grabbed H. Doe's testicles in order to "finally find out if H was a girl or a
guy.",78 The Seventh Circuit found the claim actionable, noting that the
act of grabbing another's testicles must be related to sex regardless of
either party's sex.7 9 Such a low standard for establishing the causal ele-
ment has been referred to as a "sex per se" standard, because if some-
thing was even remotely sexual, it was considered as satisfying the cau-
sation requirement. 80 The Seventh Circuit specifically stressed that the
most important test under Title VII was not why the victim has been har-
assed, but whether the conditions of his or her work environment has
been altered.81
In addition, it is significant that the Seventh Circuit considered ref-
erences to the victim's gender as satisfying the causation requirement.82
This suggests that the Seventh Circuit considered the term "sex" under
Title VII to include both one's biological sex as well as one's gender. In
Doe, the victim was not harassed because he was a male, but because he
failed to meet the appropriate gender stereotype of a male.83
The Fifth Circuit approached the issue differently and held in Gar-
cia v. Elf Atochem North America,84 that Title VII addressed only sex
discrimination against women.85 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found
that a male employee's claim that his male supervisor at a Texas chemi-
cal plant sexually harassed him were not colorable under Title VII. 86 The
Court reasoned that the purpose of Title VII was to prevent discrimina-
tion against women only, and therefore did not support claims of same-
sex harassment.
8 7
B. The Oncale Decision
The Supreme Court resolved this circuit split in 1998 when it ad-
dressed the issue of same-sex harassment in Oncale. Oncale involved a
male plaintiff, Joseph Oncale, who worked as a roustabout with an all-
male eight-man crew on an oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico.8 8 During
the course of his employment, co-workers subjected Mr. Oncale to se-
77. Id. at 576-77.
78. Id. at 577.
79. Id at 580.
80. See Hill, supra note 13, at 151.
81. Doe, 119 F.3d at 578.
82. Id. at 577 ("In view of the overt references to H.'s gender and the repeated allusions to
sexual assault, it would appear unnecessary to require any further proof that H.'s gender had some-
thing to do with this harassment; the acts speak for themselves in that regard.") (emphasis added).
83. See id.
84. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
85. See, e.g., Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52.
86. Id. at 451-52.
87. Id.
88. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77.
726 [Vol. 83:3
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vere and ongoing sexually-related humiliations, including having a bar of
soap inserted into his anus while forcibly restrained and threats of rape.89
The District Court, acting under the guidelines of Garcia, found that Mr.
Oncale had no claim, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.90
Justice Scalia, writing for the unanimous majority, found that Title
VII's prohibition of discrimination "because of sex" applies to both men
and women.91 Scalia admitted that while same-sex harassment cases
were "assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with
when it enacted Title VII," it was nonetheless within the scope of Title
VII to cover "comparable" evils as well.92 The "critical" issue, according
to Scalia, was whether the harassment resulted in discrimination; namely,
if "members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or condi-
tions of employment to which members of the other sex are not ex-
posed., 93  In other words, Scalia held that the essential determination
under a Title VII claim was not whether harassment had occurred, but
whether the harassment occurred because of the sex of the victim.94
The majority opinion went on to define various "evidentiary routes"
of finding an inference of discrimination because of sex. First, it noted
that such an inference was "easy to draw" in a typical male-female situa-
tion because such circumstances usually involve explicit or implicit pro-
posals of sexual activity and similar proposals would not be made to
members of the same sex.95 Scalia suggested that the same "chain of
inference" would be available in same-sex harassment claims if the ha-
rasser was a homosexual.96
89. See Jennifer A. Drobac, The Oncale Opinion: A Pansexual Response, 30 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 1269, 1273 (1999).
90. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77.
91. Id. at 78 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,
682 (1983)).
92. Id. at 79.
93. Id. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring)).
94. Despite this new express recognition of causation, the Court nonetheless reiterated the
importance of the requirement that the harassment be sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to create
an objectively hostile work environment - that is, behavior so egregious that it rises well above
routine interactions between members of the opposite sex. Id. at 81. Scalia noted that, taken to-
gether, these two requirements would effectively prevent Title VII from becoming a "general civility
code" for the workplace. Id. In fact, this emphasis of severity has been echoed in numerous cases
involving Title VII discrimination claims. See, e.g., Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256
(10th Cir. 2005); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001); Shepherd v.
Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999).
95. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
96. Id. Scalia also defined two other "evidentiary routes" that can be used to determine that
the discrimination was based on sex. He found that a showing that the harasser was motivated by
"general hostility" to his or her sex in the same workplace could satisfy the requirement that the
discrimination occurred because of sex. Id. Finally, one can satisfy this causal element by showing,
through direct comparative evidence, that the harasser treated men and women differently in a
mixed-sex workplace. Id. at 81.
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Oncale deviated from previous Title VII rulings in that it empha-
sized the intent of the harasser in finding causation in a discrimination
claim.97 Under Oncale, it was no longer enough to merely find that a
hostile work environment that was sexual in nature existed, as the Sev-
enth Circuit had done in Doe. 98 In fact, the same day the Court issued its
Oncale opinion, it vacated the Seventh Circuit's holding in Doe.99 Under
the new Oncale regime, the hostile environment must be present because
of the victim's sex; the harassment need not have any sexual overtones as
long as it is motivated by the victim's sex.
100
C. Circuit Interpretations of Oncale
Faced with the explicit requirement that a plaintiff bringing a same-
sex harassment claim must show his harasser's motivation stemmed from
the plaintiffs sex, the Circuits have differed only slightly in interpreting
the first evidentiary route of Oncale's holding. The Seventh Circuit, in
Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp.,101 found that in order for a plaintiff to
demonstrate that she was discriminated against because of his sex, the
plaintiff needed to bring evidence that suggested that the harasser was a
homosexual. 10 2 In Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co.,' °3 the
Third Circuit held differently, stating that in order to satisfy the "because
of sex" element, the victim need only prove that the harasser sexually
desired her.' °4 The Third Circuit reasoned that such a showing was more
than enough for a reasonable jury to deduce that the sexual discrimina-
tion was motivated by the victim's sex. 10 5 Finally, some circuits have
used a combination of both - requiring that the plaintiff show "credible
evidence" that the harasser was a homosexual and that the harasser sexu-
ally desired the plaintiff.
10 6
III. DICK V. PHONE DIRECTORIES Co. 1
07
In Dick v. Phone Directories Co., the Tenth Circuit followed the
Third Circuit's lead, finding that a plaintiff in a same-sex hostile work
environment harassment claim could satisfy the first evidentiary route
articulated in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services'0 8 by demonstrat-
ing that her harasser was motivated by sexual desire.'0 9 This differs from
97. See Hill, supra note 13, at 159.
98. See id. at 160-61.
99. Id.
100. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80.
101. 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1998).
102. Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 1009.
103. 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001).
104. Bibby, 260 F.3d at 262.
105. Id.
106. See LaDay v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 2002).
107. 397 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2005).
108. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
109. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1264.
[Vol. 83:3
DICK V. PHONE DIRECTORIES CO.
the Seventh and the Fifth Circuits' holdings that the plaintiff mush fur-
nish "credible evidence" that her harasser is a homosexual." 0
A. Facts
In Dick, the plaintiff, Ms. Diane Dick, worked as a sale representa-
tive in the Vernal, Utah office of Defendant Phone Directories Company
(PDC). I l l After approximately three years, Ms. Dick's immediate super-
visor was fired, and PDC hired Ms. Laura Bills as the Vernal office man-
ager and Ms. Dick's immediate supervisor.1 2 Ms. Dick alleged that Ms.
Bills and her co-workers began to sexually harass her about a month after
Ms. Bills was hired, and that this harassment continued for about six
months. "
3
Ms. Dick claimed the harassment was spearheaded by Ms. Bills and
three female coworkers. 1 4 Ms. Dick's allegations of the harassment
included episodes where one of her co-workers, Ms. Camie Hinkle,
would approach Ms. Bills and another female co-worker from behind
and make "sexual gestures with her body toward them.""' 5 Ms. Hinkle
would also place her foot in Ms. Bills' lap and say, "Yo buff b*tch. How
does that feel? Yo, buff b*tch. You like that."'"1 6 Ms. Hinkle also hung
a replica of a penis from the ceiling and brought a pillow into the office,
on which she and other co-workers would kneel when making references
to oral sex.17
However, the only gestures directed toward Ms. Dick involved two
attempts by Ms. Hinkle to pinch Ms. Dick's breasts, but Ms. Dick told
her to "get away" from her.'18 In addition, Ms. Hinkle once shoved a
replica of a penis in Ms. Dick's face while they were visiting a novelty
sex shop over the lunch hour. 1 9 Other allegations include another co-
worker pointing to a collection of stuffed cats on Ms. Dick's desk and
saying she had a "pussy;" another questioning Ms. Dick about a sex toy
used by lesbians; and the fact that Ms. Dick was repeatedly referred to as
"Ivanna Dick" or "Granny Dick" on a regular basis.
120
At trial, the district court granted summary judgment for PDC re-
garding Ms. Dick's Title VII hostile work environment same-sex har-
assment claims because Ms. Dick had failed to prove the harassment was
110. See id. at 1265.
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because of her sex. 12 ' The district court required Ms. Dick to show that
there was both credible evidence that her harassers were homosexual and
that they were motivated by sexual desire in order to meet Oncale's first
evidentiary route.1 22 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that a showing
that Ms. Dick's harassers were motivated by sexual desire was enough to
satisfy the causation requirement.
23
B. Holding
The Tenth Circuit noted all three "evidentiary routes" laid out in
Oncale, and concluded that Ms. Dick relied on the first route in making
her case, which required a showing that her harassers sexually desired
her. 124 The court ceded that at "first blush," the first evidentiary route
suggests the requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate that her harasser
was a homosexual. 25 In eliminating this requirement, the court noted
that the first route clearly encompasses conduct that is motivated by sex-
ual desire. 26 It arrived at this conclusion because the Oncale Court pref-
aced its discussion of the other two evidentiary routes by explicitly stat-
ing that they do not require a showing of sexual desire. 127 It stated, "[i]t
directly follows, then, that the Court considered conduct that was moti-
vated by sexual desire to meet the requirements under the first eviden-
tiary route.'
2 8
The Tenth Circuit asserted that a plaintiff need not demonstrate that
her harasser is a homosexual in order to establish that the harassment was
motivated by sexual desire. 129 It reasoned that often, a heterosexual ha-
rasser may nonetheless propose sexual activity with a victim in a harass-
ing manner.1 30 In such circumstances, there would be no corroborating
evidence beyond the harassment itself that the harasser was a homosex-
ual, yet the harassment would still be a result of the harasser's sexual
desire.' 3' The Court noted that in such situations, proving the sexual
orientation of a person could be extremely difficult.
32
Despite this holding, the question still remained whether Ms. Dick
had provided a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her harassers
were motivated by sexual desire. 33 The Court initially noted that the
district court, in granting summary judgment to PDC, relied heavily on
121. Id. at 1262.
122. See id. at 1264.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1264; see also supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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evidence that Ms. Dick was harassed because her co-workers disliked
her.134 Such evidence included statements from Ms. Dick's own deposi-
tion to the effect that she thought her co-workers would just do "things
like that" to upset her.135
The Tenth Circuit, however, reasoned that while the evidence could
support a finding that Ms. Dick was harassed because she was not liked,
a reasonable jury could also find that she was harassed because of sexual
desire. 136 As evidence, the Court cited the incidents wherein Ms. Hinkle
attempted to pinch Ms. Dick's breasts, as well as Ms. Hinkle's same-sex
advancements toward Ms. Bills (placing her foot in her lap), which could
suggest that any advances made toward Ms. Dick were also a result of
sexual desire. 137
While the Tenth Circuit did find that a question of material fact ex-
isted as to whether Ms. Dick was sexually harassed, it was equally quick
to point out that the question of whether the harassment was "severe or
pervasive enough" to qualify as discrimination under Title VII had yet to
be answered. 138 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's
decision that her harassment was not based on sex because the court used
the wrong test, and remanded the case for a determination of whether the
discrimination was based on sex, as well as whether the harassment was
severe enough to create an abusive work environment. 1
39
IV. ANALYSIS
It is difficult to find much leeway in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services's 140 holding. 141 Indeed, despite the variations in the different
circuit interpretations of the first evidentiary route, they all share the
same underlying element, which is a showing that the harasser was moti-
vated by sexual desire. 142 Some circuits, in order to find sexual desire,
additionally require that the plaintiff show that the harasser is a homo-
sexual. 143  By avoiding this additional requirement, the Tenth Circuit
established in Dick v. Phone Directories Co.'A a more practical and
theoretically stable burden of proof than its sister circuits.145
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1266.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1267.
140. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
141. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81 (outlining the possible ways a same-sex plaintiff could prove
discrimination because of sex.).
142. See id at 80.
143. See Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999); LaDay v. Cata-
lyst Tech. Inc, 302 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 2002).
144. 397 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2005).
145. See Drobac, supra note 89, at 1278-81.
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This Part will first explain the limitations that Oncale's holding
placed on same-sex harassment claims by focusing on the causation ele-
ment of the harassment claim. It will then illustrate why, within the
framework of such limitations, the Tenth Circuit's approach to Oncale's
first evidentiary route most adequately meets Title VII's broad goals.
This is because first; a showing of the harasser's homosexuality is both
difficult to prove and is inconclusive of a finding that the harasser sexu-
ally desired the victim. Second, the Tenth Circuit's broad interpretation
of the facts set a low standard to satisfy the controversial causation re-
quirement and shifts the focus back to the effects of the harassment
rather than its cause. Finally, this Part will suggest a further method to
expand the reach of Oncale's holding to the greatest number of same-sex
claims by implicitly including the social construction of gender within
the meaning of "because of sex."
A. The Limitations in "Because of Sex"
On its face Oncale purports to expand Title VII by expressly recog-
nizing same-sex harassment claims. 146 However, several authors have
argued that Oncale's emphasis on causation actually severely limits the
scope of sexual hostile work environment claims, both same-sex and
otherwise. 147 One example of Oncale's restrictive effect on same-sex
claims can be seen in the final result of Oncale itself. 148 On remand,
Joseph Oncale found his case had been rendered toothless because his
harassers were not homosexual, and thus were not motivated by sexual
desire. 149 The other two evidentiary avenues-a showing of hostility to
all men in general and that men and women were treated disparately-
were also closed to Mr. Oncale, because he worked on an all-male oil
platform.
150
Jennifer Drobac, in her article The Oncale Opinion: A Pansexual
Response, went further, looking beyond the final result in Oncale and
asserting that an entire subsection of sexual harassment claims-not only
same-sex harassment claims-exist that are arguably no longer action-
able under Oncale.151 She argued that Oncale invalidated claims wherein
workplace behavior such as hanging nude pictures of women every-
where, was sexual harassment. 15 2 Such behavior pre-Oncale was found
to be actionable under Title VII because it created a barrier to women in
the workplace by sending a message that women do not belong, and can
146. Id. at 1279.
147. See Hill, supra note 13, at 160; Drobac, supra note 89, at 1270.
148. See Hill, supra note 13, at 162.
149. Id. Note that in the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff bringing a same-sex harassment suit must
furnish "credible evidence" that his harassers are homosexual. See supra note 106 and accompany-
ing text.
150. Hill, supra note 13, at 162.
151. Drobac, supra note 89, at 1277.
152. Id.
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only belong if they are willing to subvert to the gender stereotype hang-
ing on the wall. 53 Ms. Drobac reasoned that these claims were action-
able because it was the behavior itself that discriminated and an inquiry
into the motivation of the harasser was unnecessary.l
5 4
B. Why the Tenth Circuit's Approach Best Satisfies Title VII's Goals
The Supreme Court has held that the two main goals of Title VII are
to prevent and remedy employment discrimination in the workplace.
155
In addition, the Court has suggested that Title VII aims to encourage
employees to bring sexual harassment complaints to their employer's
attention. 156 By making the elements of a sexual harassment claim more
difficult to meet in Oncale, the Court failed to effectuate these previously
articulated goals. However, the Tenth Circuit adopted a broad interpre-
tation of Oncale's requirements, and in so doing, was able to better sat-
isfy Title VII's goal of addressing all types of employment discrimina-
tion than the circuits who strictly interpreted Oncale.
1. The Dangers of Requiring a Showing of Homosexuality
The requirement that the plaintiffs of a same-sex harassment case
show that their harassers were homosexual can have unjust results, some
of which were emphasized in the final result of Oncale itself.157 Other
problems with such a requirement include the possibility that only bona
fide homosexuals could ever be found guilty of sexual harassment in
same-sex cases. 158 In reality, many self-proclaimed heterosexuals "may
find erotic and sexually stimulating the same-sex sexual advances and
aggressions [such as those] committed against Joseph Oncale.' 59
A second problem with such a requirement, one that the Tenth Cir-
cuit articulated clearly, is that proving homosexuality is often very diffi-
cult.' 60 In illustrating the problems associated with discerning what ex-
actly constitutes credible evidence of homosexuality, one author cited a
case where a woman discovered, after twenty-five years of marriage to a
man, that she was a lesbian. 16' Alternatively, people who appear more
masculine or feminine than "traditional" gender stereotypes dictate may
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1276.
155. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998).
156. See Ann M. Henry, Comment, Employer and Employee Reasonableness Regarding Re-
taliation Under the Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 553, 568.
157. See supra notes 148-50.
158. Drobac, supra note 89, at 1280.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1280-81; see also supra Part III.B (discussing the Tenth Circuit's justifications in
eliminating the requirement that the harasser be homosexual).
161. Drobac, supra note 89, at 1280-81.
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be more susceptible to erroneously being labeled a homosexual when in
fact they are not.
1 62
These examples demonstrate that limiting actionable same-sex
claims that follow Oncale's first evidentiary route to those that can fur-
nish credible evidence that the harasser is a homosexual exclude an array
of potential claims. Under such a requirement, it is possible for same-sex
harassers who are not homosexual to avoid liability. In addition, the
ambiguity of people's sexuality often makes finding credible evidence a
very difficult task. By eliminating such a requirement, the Tenth Circuit
broadened the scope of same-sex harassment suits that are actionable
through Oncale's first evidentiary route.
2. A Return to the Seventh Circuit's "Sex Per Se" Standard?
The Court's approach in Oncale has been characterized as one that
fundamentally rejected the Seventh Circuit's "sex per se" standard,
which was articulated in Doe v. City of Belleville.163 While the Seventh
Circuit found any sexual conduct satisfied the causal requirement of Title
VII's "because of sex" language, the Oncale Court stressed a much more
stringent causation requirement.164 The former standard allowed the Sev-
enth Circuit to focus on the harassment itself, rather than the superfluous
question of why the harassment was perpetrated in the first place. 65 In
addition to rejecting the requirement that the plaintiff offer credible evi-
dence that her harasser is a homosexual, the Tenth Circuit, with its ex-
pansive interpretation of the facts in determining whether the harassment
was motivated by sexual desire, was able to reconcile the Seventh Cir-
cuit's emphasis on the effects of the harassment with the tougher causa-
tion requirement in Oncale.
Specifically, the Court interpreted seemingly mild incidents as in-
dicative of sexual desire. 66 This includes the "same-sex sexual conduct"
that Ms. Bills and Ms. Hinkle engaged in around the workplace.167 It
also includes Ms. Hinkle's attempts to touch Ms. Dick's breasts.168 It is
significant that the Tenth Circuit found harassing behavior that was mo-
tivated by sexual desire in acts that merely suggest sexual desire because
it mirrors the language used by the Seventh Circuit in Doe.169 Such a
162. Id. at 1281.
163. Hill, supra note 13, at 151-52; see also supra Part II.A (discussing the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in Doe).





169. Compare Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 580 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Frankly, we find
it hard to think of a situation in which someone intentionally grabs another's testicles for reasons
entirely unrelated to that person's gender.") with Dick, 397 F.3d at 1266 ("Ms. Hinlde touched, on
more than one occasion, one of the most intimate parts of Ms. Dick's body-an act seldom carried out
without some sort of sexual motivation.").
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holding makes meeting Oncale's causal requirement of the first eviden-
tiary route more plausible in the Tenth Circuit than in other circuits.
This intimates that in the Tenth Circuit, a similar "sex per se" stan-
dard as the now-defunct one the Seventh Circuit employed in Doe is pre-
sent. Granted, there are several differences. The most notable is that
under Oncale, it is necessary to demonstrate the harasser's motivation by
sexual desire, and a mere showing of sexually-related conduct is not
enough to satisfy Title VII.'70 However, the Tenth Circuit reconciled this
new requirement with the Seventh Circuit's broad causal standard by
finding that any sexual conduct 71 could be indicative of harassment mo-
tivated by sexual desire. Instead of finding conduct that is sexual in na-
ture satisfies the causal requirement, the Tenth Circuit found that any
conduct indicative of sexual desire satisfies the causal requirement.
1 72
The low Tenth Circuit standard for satisfying the causal requirement
allows for more focus on effects of the harassment itself. Thus, a court
can take the time to examine thoroughly a much more pertinent question:
how severe and pervasive is the harassment? This is a more desirable
outcome because the material question becomes one of whether harass-
ment occurred in the first place, not why the harassment occurred. This
is consistent with a main Title VII goal: avoiding harm to protected
classes in the workplace. 73 By focusing on the effects of the behavior in
question rather than the reason why it is happening, courts are more able
to address any harm that discriminating behavior may inflict.
C. Beyond Sex
This article has argued that the Tenth Circuit interpreted Oncale's
language in an expansive way.' 74 However, it is possible to further ex-
pand Oncale to reach the greatest number of harassment victims. 175 To-
day, there remain many sex discrimination claims that are not directly
causally linked to the victim's biological sex-and are therefore not ac-
tionable under Title VII-but still result in an undeniably hostile envi-
ronment. Often these people are harassed because of their perceived
gender role or their sexual orientation. 176
170. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
171. "Sexual conduct," as used by the Tenth Circuit in Dick, refers to conduct that is sugges-
tive of sexual intercourse. See Dick, 397 F.3d at 1266 ("The record contains sufficient evidence
from which a jury could find that her harassers' conduct was motivated by sexual desire .... [For
example,] Ms. Hinkle and Ms. Bills engaged in same-sex sexual conduct with other people in the
workplace .. .[and] Ms. Hinkle allegedly rubbed Ms. Bills' crotch while asking Ms. Bills if she
liked it .....
172. Id.
173. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) ("The statute's 'primary
objective' is 'a prophylactic one'; it aims, chiefly, 'not to provide redress but to avoid harm."').
174. See supra Part III.B (discussing the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Dick).
175. See supra Part IV.A (discussing various writers' criticisms of the Oncale opinion).
176. See Drobac, supra note 89, at 1280-84.
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This remainder of this article will argue that Oncale's decision to
define the word "sex" to only include one's biological sex and not one's
gender has resulted in limiting potential sexual harassment claims. It
will demonstrate how this narrow definition conflicts with the underlying
arguments for the sexual harassment doctrine as well as the Court's pre-
vious sexual harassment jurisprudence. Finally, it will suggest that a
broader interpretation of "sex" may create some actionable claims which
involve discrimination based on one's sexual orientation.
One of the strongest criticisms of Oncale stems from its narrow in-
terpretation of the word sex.17 7 Oncale's narrow interpretation of what
constitutes discrimination based on sex implies that the term "sex" refers
only to biological sex.178 The inherent danger in such a holding is that
while the Supreme Court may not choose to recognize discrimination
because of one's gender as sex discrimination, it is nonetheless true that
our culture has been conflating one's biological sex to one's gendered
behavior for centuries. 179 Same-sex harassment often occurs because the
harasser takes issue with the victim's failure to meet his or her traditional
gender role, and not his or her biological sex in the strictest sense.1
80
1. Conflict with Historical Arguments
By implicitly assuming in Oncale that all men are masculine and all
women are feminine, Justice Scalia effectively eliminated harassment
claims by effeminate men or masculine women. 18' Such a narrow inter-
pretation is at odds with both of the underlying arguments that originally
supported the recognition of a hostile environment sexual harassment
claim. First, feminists aimed to eliminate gender-based stereotyping.'
82
Feminists understood differences existed between men and women on a
physiological level, but resented (and continue to resent) the assumption
that such physical differences automatically resigned women to inferior
societal roles. 183 The sex of women was never the issue, it was the gen-
der roles that they were expected to fill because of their sex.' 84 By de-
claring that the harasser must have issue with the actual sex of the victim,
177. See id. at 1269.
178. See id. (arguing that the Oncale Court never used the word "gender," whereas in previous
opinions, it used "sex" and "gender" interchangeably); see also Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 ("The critical
issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.") (quoting
Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). This suggests that the
Oncale court believes that the only pertinent motivation for harassment is one's biological sex.
179. See Drobac, supra note 89, at 1281.
180. See id, at 1281-82.
181. Id.
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the Court fails to address motivations that might stem from disgust at a
victim's failure to meet traditional gender roles. 
8 5
Second, Oncale relied on an analogy to racial harassment in finding
that same-sex sexual harassment was viable under Title VII.186 In con-
doning the use of this racial analogy in the context of same-sex sexual
harassment, Justice Scalia wrote that, "in the related context of racial
discrimination in the workplace we have rejected any conclusive pre-
sumption that an employer will not discriminate against members of his
own race." 187 As Scalia himself recognized, it is entirely possible that a
racial harasser may use racial epithets against people of several races,
and still be guilty of racial discrimination. 188 In light of this reliance on
such an analogy, it is illogical to claim that a male sexual harasser who
harasses men based on their gender is not actionable under Title VII. 18 9
In such a situation, the environment, such as one inundated by racial epi-
thets, is still hostile even though it is more likely the harasser was moti-
vated by the victim's gender rather than his or her sex.
2. Conflict with Precedent
Not only does the narrow interpretation of sex in Oncale fail as a
policy matter, it seriously conflicts with another of the Supreme Court's
own cases, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 90 In Price Waterhouse, the
plaintiff Ann Hopkins was denied a partnership in an accounting firm
based in part on her failure to act "feminine."' 9' The Supreme Court, in
an opinion written by Justice Brennan, found that her claim was action-
able, because she was able to fulfill the "because of sex" requirement by
showing that her employer relied on gender-based considerations in com-
ing to its decision regarding her promotion. 92 Justice Brennan wrote,
"Congress' intent to forbid employers to take gender into account in
making employment decisions appears on the face of the statute."'
193
This strongly suggests that Justice Brennan thought that gender consid-
erations were included in the word "sex' in Title VII.
In addition to embracing gender in the definition of sex, the Price
Waterhouse majority specifically decried the need for the plaintiff to
185. See Drobac, supra note 89, at 1281-82. See also Franke, supra note 21, at 34-35. Ms.
Franke, one of the leading feminist scholars today, has argued that in addition to reinforcing the
"gender hierarchy" in the workplace, sexual harassment has a dual aim: to produce masculine (het-
ero)sexual men, and feminine (hetero)sexual women. Id. Therefore, according to Ms. Franke's
paradigm, individuals of either gender who refuse or fail to conform to stereotypes can be victims of
sexual harassment. Id.
186. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78-79.
187. Id. at 78.
188. See Drobac, supra note 89, at 1279.
189. Id.
190. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
191. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
192. Id. at 241-42.
193. Id. at 239.
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identify a "precise causal role" in the discriminatory action. 94 The Court
supported its broad definition of causation by noting that Congress re-
jected an amendment that would prohibit discrimination "solely because
of" sex. 195 This conflicts with Oncale's explicit emphasis on causation.
3. Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation?
Courts across the country agree that discriminating based on one's
sexual orientation is "a noxious practice, deserving of censure and op-
probrium," and is "morally reprehensible."' 196 However, Congress has
repeatedly rejected attempts to amend current legislation to include a
cause of action for discrimination based on sexual orientation.197 A leg-
islative solution may be difficult to attain at this point in time.
However, many of the claims that legislation forbidding discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation would address can potentially become
actionable through a broad interpretation of the term sex. This is because
at least in part, gay men and women are discriminated against because
they fail to meet the gender stereotypes that their sex requires them to
meet.' 98 Although such a solution does not address the entire spectrum
of discrimination based on sexual orientation, it potentially provides re-
dress to gay men and women who are harassed largely because they fail
to act in a sufficiently feminine or masculine manner.
CONCLUSION
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services'99 limits the ability of many
to bring same-sex hostile work environment suits although it purported to
expand Title VII. However, under the Tenth Circuit's broad interpreta-
tion of the first evidentiary route in Dick v. Phone Directories Co.,200 the
same-sex plaintiff has a better chance of successfully combating work-
place sexual harassment. Despite this step forward, there remain other
methods for effectively addressing all sexual discrimination in the work-
place, but it would require the Supreme Court to take a more expansive
approach to the term "sex" under Title VII than it articulated in Oncale.
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194. Id. at 241.
195. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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